Advocacy Journalism, the Politics of Humanitarian Intervention and the Syrian War by Hammond, P. et al.
1 
Chapter 3: Advocacy journalism, the politics of humanitarian intervention 
 and the Syrian war 
 
Philip Hammond, Sumaya Al Nahed and Tara McCormack 
 
 
Since 2011 the international media have done much to highlight the suffering of 
civilians in the on-going war in Syria, including through innovative forms of reporting 
such as VR journalism and news games.1 Yet in some respects coverage has harked 
back to an earlier era, recalling the style of ‘attached’ or advocacy journalism that 
developed in the 1990s. As in much Western reporting of the wars of that period, 
some journalists have understood the conflict in simplified, black-and-white terms 
and called for ‘something to be done’ to counter an evil regime and rescue innocent 
victims. Such coverage – like Western policy itself – has only occasionally involved 
direct and overt military interventionism (Briggs et al. 2017: 167). Yet a subtler but no 
less significant use of ‘emotive phrases…such as, “History will judge us”…“We 
cannot look the other way”…and “What will the world think”’ has beaten a steady 
drum for escalating international involvement in the conflict (Milojevich and Beattie 
2018: 831–2). 
 
This narcissistic approach, characteristic of 1990s-style advocacy journalism (Hume 
1997), has led many to interpret the Syrian war as a test for Western self-
understanding. In the Telegraph (24 August 2013), for example, Matthew d’Ancona 
said that the ‘Syrian conflict holds a mirror up to Britain and asks us what sort of 
nation we want to be’; while the BBC’s Gavin Hewitt interpreted it as a ‘test for 
Europe’ (BBC, 27 August 2013). In its editorial columns, the Guardian depicted the 
battle for Aleppo as ‘a rebuke to America and the world’ (10 February 2016), where 
‘the credibility of western strategies’ was ‘hang[ing] in the balance’ (3 August), and as 
‘a humiliation for the UN’ (30 November). Columnist Natalie Nougayrède described 
the conflict as ‘a moral defeat for Europeans’, affecting ‘how we relate to the world, to 
ourselves and to the values we like to profess’ (Guardian, 27 February 2018). Times 
columnist Philip Collins acknowledged that ‘Intervention…will mean chaos’, but 
shrugged this off: ‘there is chaos already’, he argued, and it was ‘important to add 
weight to our moral impulse’ (Times, 24 February 2012). 
 
For Collins – formerly a speechwriter for Tony Blair – the problem was that the ‘idea 
of liberal intervention…fell apart in Iraq’. Syria, he maintained, was the ‘counter-
factual for Iraq’, showing ‘what Iraq would have been like, sooner or later’ and 
thereby providing a retrospective justification for the 2003 invasion. Jonathan 
Freedland pursued a similar line in the Guardian (10 February 2012): Iraq had 
‘tainted for a generation the idea once known as “liberal interventionism”’, he said, 
but this made ‘no moral sense’. Initially, it perhaps seemed possible to rehabilitate 
this idea: Freedland had made a similar, but more optimistic argument about Libya, 
where, he maintained, ‘the case for intervention remains strong’ (Guardian, 22 March 
2011); and Collins hoped that the ‘success of our intervention in Libya…is redeeming 
the argument that was lost in Iraq’ (Times, 24 February 2012). In August 2013, the 
parliamentary defeat of British government proposals for airstrikes in Syria, and 
President Barack Obama’s reversal of his earlier decision to take direct action if the 
‘red line’ of chemical weapons use was crossed, put full-blown Western military 
intervention off the immediate agenda – although the US and its allies carried out air 
strikes in 2017 and 2018. As the ‘successful’ Libyan intervention also fell apart in 
bloodshed and chaos, the prospect of rehabilitating liberal interventionism in Syria 
receded even further. 
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Committed commentators did not react well to the ‘tainting’ of the idea of liberal 
interventionism. Freedland despaired that ‘public opinion seems utterly disengaged, 
unbothered by the slaughter’, and inveighed against the ‘complicity’ and ‘indifference’ 
of ‘both the public and anti-war left’ (Guardian, 19 October 2012, 21 February 2018). 
Similarly, in the Independent Kate Maltby accused her readers: ‘If you say 
“something must be done” about Aleppo but opposed David Cameron when he tried 
to act, you have blood on your hands’ (14 December 2016). Articulating a common 
theme of such commentary, Maltby particularly denounced the ‘denialists’ and ‘twitter 
bots’ who questioned official claims about the war, accusing those who ‘willingly 
consumed such propaganda’ of guilt by association with the ‘Assadist-Putinist war 
machine’. As the attempt to establish a clear moral framework of an evil regime 
massacring innocent civilians became increasingly frustrated – by the complexities of 
the conflict itself and by the many sceptical and critical responses circulating freely 
online – there was an attempt to close down debate by denouncing anti-war critics. 
 
This chapter analyses those efforts to shore up the mainstream narrative and 
delegitimise dissent. To begin, however, it is important to place this in context. The 
echoes of 1990s-style advocacy journalism highlighted above are not surprising 
since, as critics have noted, the Bosnian war has repeatedly been invoked as a 
precedent to bolster calls for intervention in Syria and elsewhere (Gibbs 2015). When 
journalists looked at Syria and saw ‘another Srebrenica’ (Guardian, 20 February 
2018), they cast themselves as critics of a Western policy which they understood to 
be far too uninvolved and non-interventionist. Yet as in Bosnia (Chandler 2000), 
Western political, financial and military interventions have, from the outset, escalated 
conflict. As Patrick Higgins (2015) notes, in commentary on Syria ‘the demand to “do 
something” sidesteps what has already been done – there is a foundational 




The myth of Western inaction 
 
Beginning in 2011 in the context of protests in several Arab states, the Syrian 
uprising rapidly became an internationalised, multi-sided civil war. From the start, 
America, Britain and other European governments explicitly argued that President 
Bashar al-Assad could not remain in power, inevitably emboldening the rebels. By 
summer 2011, an ‘activist’ in Damascus was telling the Washington Post: ‘It was as if 
someone told us, “We have your back”…we’ve entered a new phase now because 
what the US has done is tell [Assad] there’s no way out now except to fight’ (19 
August 2011). Western governments were soon not only stripping the Syrian 
government of legitimacy but also backing those they thought should overthrow and 
replace it. As the Washington Post reported in 2016, the ‘centerpiece of the US 
strategy to press [Assad] to step aside’ was a ‘covert CIA program that has trained 
and armed thousands of Syrian fighters’ (23 October 2016). By this point, the 
strategy was seen by some insiders as having fallen apart – the Post article quoted a 
‘senior US official’ wondering ‘whether agency-supported fighters can still be 
considered moderate, and whether the program can accomplish anything beyond 
adding to the carnage in Syria’ – and the CIA programme was reportedly ended in 
2017. Yet it is questionable whether the public claims – that the US and its allies 
were only helping ‘moderate’ groups, which had been ‘vetted’ to exclude extremists – 
were ever accurate (Gambill 2012). A more realistic assessment of US policy was 
offered by Jeffrey Sachs: ‘We started a war to overthrow a regime…a major war 
effort, shrouded in secrecy, never debated by Congress, never explained to the 
American people….And this created chaos.’2 
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The ostensible beneficiary of Western support has been the Free Syrian Army (FSA), 
initially established in 2011 by Syrian Army defectors, possibly with Turkish 
intelligence support (Lund 2013). The name, however, was loosely applied to 
numerous groups, including many radical Islamist factions. By 2012, as a ‘cascade’ 
of US politicians advocated arming the rebels, the FSA remained ‘something of a 
fiction, a convenient mailbox for a diverse, unorganized collection of local fighting 
groups’ (Lynch 2012), ranging from the original Syrian Army defectors to militant 
jihadis. Colonel Abdel Jabbar al-Okaidi, described as one of the ‘most senior Syrian 
rebel commanders to be backed by Britain and the United States’ (Telegraph, 4 
November 2013), gave interviews in which he spoke warmly of the constructive and 
cooperative relationship between the FSA and Islamic State (ISIS), and defended the 
record of FSA ally and al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.3 Other groups fighting 
under the FSA banner and in receipt of ‘financial and arms support from the US’ 
included Nour al-Din al-Zinki, who infamously videoed themselves beheading a child 
(Los Angeles Times, 20 July 2016). In 2015 Charles Lister described a successful 
offensive, planned and executed over several months, which involved ‘moderate and 
conservative Syrian Islamists…al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and several 
independent jihadist factions’ alongside the FSA. A ‘US-led operations room in 
southern Turkey’ had been ‘instrumental in facilitating [the] involvement’ of the 
various factions, and had ‘specifically encouraged a closer cooperation with Islamists 
commanding frontline operations’ (Lister 2015). 
 
Given this record of cooperation, it seems reasonable to conclude that there was a 
concerted international effort by America and its allies, involving many millions of 
dollars, to overthrow Assad by deliberately funding and arming radical Islamist terror 
groups. Even on the most charitably uncritical interpretation one would have to 
suppose that in their pursuit of regime change in Syria, foreign powers were 
extraordinarily careless in funnelling money and weapons into the war zone, with, if 
not little regard, then certainly little control over where these ended up. An 
investigation by the BBC’s Panorama programme revealed how British funding for 
the ‘Free Syrian Police’ had ended up ‘funding jihadis’. This was not a deliberate 
policy, but both the UK government and the private contractor delivering the project 
apparently turned a blind eye to fraud and corruption. Most tellingly, witnesses said it 
was virtually impossible to operate without paying and cooperating with groups such 
as al-Zinki and al-Nusra, who were the de facto civil authorities in their respective 
areas of control.4 In 2012 the New York Times was already reporting that most of the 
arms supplied to Syrian rebel groups were ‘going to hard-line Islamic jihadists’ (14 
October 2012). By mid-2015, the goal of the CIA’s mission in Syria – now ‘one the 
agency’s largest covert operations, with a budget approaching $1 billion’ – had 
reportedly ‘shifted from ousting Assad to countering the rise of extremist groups 
including al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State’ (Washington 
Post, 12 June 2015). The fact that a few months later, as noted above, Lister was 
writing of successful cooperation with al-Nusra coordinated by the CIA makes this 
seem rather implausible. Either way, a billion-dollar mission can hardly be described 
as inaction. 
 
Yet at the end of 2015 commentators were still maintaining that, in contrast to 
Russian support for the Syrian government, ‘Washington’s support to the opposition 
is more the stuff of jokes than anything serious’ (Matta 2015). As for Islamic State, a 
study by Conflict Armament Research (2017: 8, 121) concluded that ‘international 
weapon supplies to factions in the Syrian conflict have significantly augmented the 
quantity and quality of weapons available to IS forces’, including materials to 
manufacture ‘rudimentary chemical projectiles’. The report noted that such ‘adverse 
effects associated with international intervention in civil wars’ were ‘not new’: 
Western support for the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 1980s had ‘displayed 
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similar patterns’ (2017: 146). A further parallel with the ’80s, of course, was that a 
local war became a proxy for conflict between the US and Russia. By mid-2015 ISIS 
reportedly controlled half of Syrian territory (Guardian, 21 May 2015), but the Syrian 
government asked Russia for military support and the ensuing Russian bombing 
campaign helped to push ISIS back, turning the war in Assad’s favour. Russian 
military intervention effectively confounded Western hopes of regime change in 
Syria. In addition, if Western policy was intended to counter the regional influence of 
Assad’s other key ally, Iran, it probably had the opposite effect: making the conflict a 
matter of the regime’s survival also made its relationship with Iran closer and more 
significant (Glass 2015). 
 
Russia’s intervention was one of the key factors highlighted by Philip Gordon, former 
White House Coordinator for the Middle East, in arguing that US policy ‘must be 
rethought’. He noted ruefully that: 
 
Editorials in the Washington Post and elsewhere blame US ‘inaction’ for the 
tragedy in Syria while calling for ‘robust intervention’ and ‘more aggressive 
US effort to bring down’ the Assad regime. Former US officials…denounce 
‘piecemeal’ US efforts to support the opposition and call on the United States 
to sharply ramp up those efforts to help bring down Assad. Many pundits and 
columnists seem to share…[the] conclusion that Washington’s unwillingness 
to act ‘decisively’ is proof that ‘the United States has abandoned its faith in its 
power and its duty to do good’. 
(Gordon 2015) 
 
The logic of such arguments, Gordon observed, was to push for an escalation to full-
scale military action. Rejecting this as dangerous and unpredictable, he nevertheless 
acknowledged that the ‘current policy’ of the US and its allies – to ‘train and equip a 
moderate, unified opposition capable of pressuring the Assad regime to change’ – 
had failed. Following Daniel Hallin, we would expect to see this breakdown of elite 
consensus on Western policy reflected in media coverage. Advocacy journalists, 
however, responded by seeking to police the boundaries of ‘legitimate controversy’ 
(Hallin 1986: 110). 
 
 
Losing control of the narrative 
 
Frustration at criticism of the official narrative about Syria came to a head at the end 
of 2017, in the context of a wider panic about ‘fake news’ and Russian attempts to 
manipulate US elections via social media (Chen 2018). The Guardian (Solon 2017) 
said it had ‘uncovered how [a] counter-narrative [about Syria] is propagated online by 
a network of anti-imperialist activists, conspiracy theorists and trolls with the support 
of the Russian government (which provides military support to the Syrian regime)’. 
This framing was plainly designed to delegitimise any ‘counter-narrative’ by linking it 
to ‘conspiracy theorists’ (mentioned six times in the article), internet trolls and bots 
(five mentions), and especially to Russia (mentioned 23 times). The author, 
technology journalist Olivia Solon, interviewed academics and other specialists to 
depict a systematic and coordinated effort at deception by a hidden network 
operating an ‘online propaganda machine’ or ‘a factory’. 
 
Solon’s tone of sensational revelation was clearly added for dramatic effect, since 
much of what was ‘uncovered’ was not particularly novel. Kate Starbird from the 
University of Washington was quoted for her research on Twitter from three months 
earlier. Scott Lucas from Birmingham University was quoted explaining how 
‘propagandists are able to create a “manufactured consensus” that gives legitimacy 
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to fringe views’, but he had been airing such opinions for over a year, as had another 
interviewee, Eliot Higgins, introduced as the ‘founder of the investigative reporting 
collective Bellingcat’.5 One new source was Graphika, which describes itself as a 
‘social media intelligence firm’. After apparently spending ‘years analysing a range of 
Russian disinformation campaigns’ the company was commissioned by the Syria 
Campaign, described by Solon as a ‘human rights group’. Presumably not 
coincidentally, the Syria Campaign published its own report two days later, under the 
title ‘Killing the Truth: How Russia is fuelling a disinformation campaign to cover up 
war crimes in Syria’. Solon had essentially pre-released the report’s findings with 
supporting quotes from sympathetic experts. 
 
The Syria Campaign’s (2017: 40) report underscored the rationale for the 
accompanying Guardian exposé: that awkward questions (or ‘conspiracy theories’) 
about official accounts of the war were now ‘seeping into mainstream discourse with 
very little scrutiny’. Two women who had reported independently from Syria – Eva 
Bartlett and Vanessa Beeley – attracted particular opprobrium. Solon quoted the 
Syria Campaign’s director, James Sadri, saying that Beeley ‘should not be taken 
seriously’ since she was a ‘key player’ in the Russian government’s ‘propaganda 
campaign’. The Syria Campaign (2017: 22) report in turn described her as the ‘queen 
of disinformation’, placing her ‘at the heart of this Russian-backed disinformation 
campaign’. The aim was evidently to police the boundaries of acceptable opinion: the 
Syria Campaign (2017: 5) offered recommendations to technology companies, social 
media users, governments and news organisations, advising the latter: ‘Be careful 
who you recognise as journalists. It can be used as a label to legitimise 
propagandists’. 
 
The Syria Campaign report offered only one example of ‘fringe views’ entering the 
mainstream: the work of US journalist Max Blumenthal on AlterNet. Yet perhaps this 
was at least partly a response to the fact that (as discussed below) Blumenthal had 
written critically about the Syria Campaign itself. The Graphika research showed that 
of all the suspect Twitter accounts identified, the one with the ‘greatest reach and 
influence’ was that of Lebanese woman Sarah Abdallah (Syria Campaign 2017: 33). 
The accusations against Abdallah were that she ‘posts a large amount of pro-
Russian content’; she has many Twitter followers; and some these followers are 
influential people, including journalists (whose names they published online). These 
things are true, but constitute an absurd charge-sheet. Abdallah does post much pro-
Russian content, including topless photos of Vladimir Putin, but unless admiring 
Russia is itself a thoughtcrime it is difficult to see the problem. She does have many 
Twitter followers – but less than a third of the number attracted by eight-year-old 
Bana Alabed, whose tweets from rebel-held Aleppo were eagerly tracked by the 
international media (New York Times, 7 December 2016). The journalists following 
Abdallah seem to give her far less attention than they did the bogus ‘Gay Girl in 
Damascus’ account – written by 40-year-old American Tom MacMaster – which 
‘gained a worldwide readership and was closely followed by news organisations’.6 
The Syria Campaign (2017: 33) found it ‘remarkable that this individual with no 
professional background has emerged as such [an] influential commentator in this 
debate’ – but the same could be said of Rami Abdulrahman, who runs the ‘Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights’ from his home in Coventry (New York Times, 9 April 
2013); or Eliot Higgins, the former ‘unemployed finance and admin worker’ with ‘no 
training in weapons, human rights research or journalism’ whose work has been 
‘taken up by everyone from Amnesty International to the New York Times’ (Guardian, 
21 March, 2013).7 Indeed, in 2012 the Guardian’s Comment Is Free blog carried an 
article detailing how Western journalists had passively reproduced the views of 
Syrian opposition spokespeople ‘selling the idea of military intervention and regime 
change’ (12 July 2012). 
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It is also true that critics such as Beeley have managed to get a hearing via 
‘alternative’ websites or Russian media. Yet it seems odd that such relatively modest 
media resources were seen as so threatening. Perhaps the real worry was that 
‘respectable’ sources were also questioning the simplistic moral narrative about 
Syria. ‘Coverage of the Syrian war will be remembered as one of the most shameful 
episodes in the history of the American press’, said former New York Times 
correspondent Stephen Kinzer, for example (Boston Globe, 18 February 2016). In 
Foreign Affairs, American professor Max Abrahms (2017) criticised the ‘pro-rebel 
bias dominant in Western outlets’ which were promoting a ‘pro-regime change 
narrative’. Veteran Middle East correspondent Patrick Cockburn (2017) said that 
‘Western news organisations have almost entirely outsourced their coverage to the 
rebel side’, resulting in ‘partisan reporting’ which had presented the siege of east 
Aleppo as ‘a battle between good and evil’. Another veteran foreign correspondent, 
Mary Dejevsky (2018) said she sympathised with ‘a dissident strain of 
thinking…which is at odds with the official consensus’, declaring that: ‘we reject, or at 
very least distrust, the dominant official narrative, which appears designed at once to 
get the UK and other Western countries more directly involved and to thwart or 
discredit Russia’. In seeking to close down such dissident thought, the Guardian and 
the Syria Campaign were acting, not as neutral defenders of truth, but as partisan 
advocates for a particular understanding of the war. 
 
Efforts to delegitimise critique have extended to academia: the morning after the April 
2018 US-led airstrikes on Syria, the Times devoted its front page to an attack on 
academics who had questioned the rationale for the bombing. The headline article – 
‘Apologists for Assad working in British universities’ – was accompanied by two-page 
spread denouncing the academic Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media8 
as ‘agents of disinformation and cheerleaders for despotism’ who, it strongly implied, 
should not be employed at British universities. For good measure, the Times also 
denounced the Working Group as ‘Assad’s Useful Idiots’ in its editorial column (14 
April 2018). Though claiming to support ‘untrammelled academic inquiry’, the Times 
argued that the scholars associated with the Group were nothing but a ‘coterie of 
Assad apologists’ – ‘agents of disinformation’ whose work was ‘a violation of the 
ethos of academic research’. Researchers affiliated to the Working Group had 
already described how asking questions about the media presentation of Syria led to 
them being ‘immediately attacked’ (Allday 2016), drawing ‘abuse or disbelief’ via 
social media (Mason 2018). As this suggests, efforts to discipline dissenters may 
have had a chilling effect on debate. Generally, however, the effort seems to have 
backfired. It remains (for now) difficult to close down discussion online, and those 
whose views were targeted as unacceptable have responded robustly and been 
defended by others.9 Readers may judge for themselves who came out best from 
these exchanges, but the key point here is that the anti-propaganda ‘investigations’ 




The White Helmets: a case study in propaganda 
 
The single most important focus of these debates about propaganda (highlighted in 
the Times coverage, Solon’s article and the Syria Campaign report) was the Syrian 
volunteer rescue organisation the White Helmets – described by Solon as a 
‘humanitarian organisation’ which had ‘exposed…war crimes’ and was ‘credited with 
saving thousands of civilians’. Their work, she noted, had received ‘positive 
international recognition’, including ‘an Oscar-winning Netflix documentary’ and ‘two 
Nobel peace prize nominations’. Towards the end of the article, Solon acknowledged 
7 
that there had been ‘isolated rogue actors’ who had been ‘used to discredit the entire 
group’, for example being ‘photographed with guns despite marketing themselves as 
unarmed’. But such ‘isolated incidents’ were dismissed with a supporting quote from 
the organisation’s head, Raed al-Saleh. These, in other words, were the good guys, 
the local heroes saving civilians and exposing atrocities. The Syria Campaign 
advocates and fundraises for the White Helmets; the Guardian carries articles by its 
leader10 and called for the organisation to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. In its 5 
October 2016 editorial, the paper argued that awarding the prize was ‘the very least 
the west can do’, having ‘utterly failed Syrians, by failing to protect them’. In seeking 
to defend the White Helmets from criticism, the aim was also to defend this view of 
the conflict, in which Western inaction was the main problem. As the Syria Campaign 
(2017: 4) explained: ‘The international community has done little to stop the bombing 
of Syrian civilians….Now governments around the world and social media companies 
are allowing Russia a free hand to target rescue workers and cast doubt on the 
evidence of war crimes they are collecting’. From that perspective, any ‘counter-
narrative’ looked deeply suspect. 
 
The White Helmets present themselves as a politically-neutral civil defence 
organisation, made up of ordinary citizens – usually described as ‘former bakers, 
tailors, teachers’, and so on – who have saved thousands of lives (114,431 at the 
time of writing in mid-2018). Even if we accept such claims, however, it does seem 
extraordinary that a search-and-rescue outfit would attract millions of dollars from 
foreign governments (channelled through third parties), would devote such time and 
resources to filming their rescue missions, and would campaign in concert with 
others to influence foreign media and public opinion. Danish peace researcher Jan 
Oberg (2016) suggests that although the White Helmets are ‘treated as 
uncontroversial in virtually all Western mainstream media’, we should be ‘cautious 
with taking information about them at face value’. Oberg does not discount claims 
that the White Helmets are ordinary Syrians who have volunteered as rescuers, but 
suggests that it can be understood as a ‘dual-purpose organisation’ – the other 
purpose being to act as a propaganda focus for the ‘foundations, PR and marketing 
firms, change organisations, NATO governments and NGOs’ who surround it and 
use it for ‘less noble, war-promoting purposes’. As Christina Lin argues, the 
promotion of the White Helmets is part of an ‘increasing US trend of weaponizing 
human rights’ (Asia Times, 24 October 2016). 
 
Indeed, the White Helmets themselves have played an important role in this 
propaganda effort, since they have consistently filmed themselves and the rebel-held 
areas in which they operate in such a way as to sustain the West’s Manichean 
narrative about Syria. There has been no comparable effort to support aid and 
rescue work for victims of rebel attacks, even though, as former Washington Post 
reporter John Hanrahan (2016a) points out, there has been plenty of evidence that 
they need it. Discussing a UN report which showed that ‘both sides commit 
massacres’, for example, Charles Glass (2015) wrote that civilians suffered 
‘unimaginable torment at the hands of government and opposition forces alike’. 
Human Rights Watch has repeatedly documented ‘serious abuses committed by 
opposition forces’, saying that they have ‘indiscriminately attacked civilians in 
government-held territory’ and have ‘killed and maimed hundreds of civilians and 
destroyed civilian infrastructure in violation of the laws of war’. 11  Those were 
presumably unworthy victims, since they did not warrant any Western funding or aid, 
let alone international PR campaigns and Oscar-winning Netflix documentaries. 
 
As Scott Ritter (2016) notes, there is ‘a symbiotic, hand-in-glove relationship between 
the anti-Assad rhetoric of the ostensibly “neutral and impartial” White Helmets and 
the policy objectives of their funders’. The Dubai-based company Analysis, 
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Research, and Knowledge (ARK) claims credit for establishing the White Helmets, in 
partnership with ‘Syrian local communities and the Turkish NGO AKUT’.12 Run by a 
former British diplomat, ARK’s client list is exclusively composed of foreign 
governments, government agencies and the EU. By the end of 2014, according to 
the company’s website, ARK had ‘provided UK, US and Japanese government-
funded training and equipment to over 400 Syrian volunteers’, at which point a 
separate organisation was established to take over: Mayday Rescue, headed by 
ARK employee and former British military officer James LeMesurier. According to 
LeMesurier, Mayday is ‘funded by governments which, loosely speaking, are 
connected to Friends of the Syrian People’.13 This is the international diplomatic 
initiative which, presumably to avoid any Russian or Chinese veto in the UN, meets 
to coordinate policy with the Syrian opposition, for example agreeing in 2013 to 
provide ‘urgent support to rebels who are fighting President Bashar al-Assad’.14 The 
fact that some of these same governments also provide millions of dollars for civil 
defence in rebel-held areas may be completely unconnected to their support for 
armed groups, but even if it were, questions would remain about the final destination 
of the money. Around half the White Helmets’ funding comes via Mayday Rescue – 
according to LeMesurier, $20–25m annually, with the main donors being Britain and 
other European governments, while a further $23m comes from the US 
(Independent, 5 October 2016). US funding comes via another contractor, 
Chemonics, which also handles other projects in Syria for the US government’s 
Office of Transition Initiatives, the costs of which run into the hundreds of millions. As 
Blumenthal (2016b) points out, Chemonics was accused of wasting tens of millions 
of dollars from earlier contracts. Given the BBC’s investigation of how money for 
policing ended up in the hands of armed groups, funding for civil defence in rebel-
controlled areas may also require closer scrutiny.15 
 
The main significance of the White Helmets, however, is the publicity that surrounds 
them. As Ritter (2016) comments, ‘without this propagandist value the White Helmets 
would not receive donations on the scale that they currently enjoy’. That propaganda 
value is mostly added by the Syria Campaign, whose activism seeks to influence 
Western media by focusing on the civil defence group. It is no wonder that the Syria 
Campaign sought to undermine Blumenthal by suggesting he was peddling fringe 
conspiracy theories, since he had exposed them as the ‘creation of international PR 
firms’ (Blumenthal 2016a). Specifically, Blumenthal highlighted the Campaign’s 
‘connections to Avaaz, a global public relations outfit that played an instrumental role 
in generating support for a no-fly zone in Libya’, and to ‘Purpose, another PR firm 
spun out of Avaaz’.16 On its website, the Syria Campaign says it is ‘an initiative of the 
Voices Project’,17 which is where the various groups intersect: the Voices Project was 
set up by Purpose and Avaaz co-founder Jeremy Heimans, and includes Purpose 
co-founder Tim Dixon as a director.18 Other Avaaz co-founders include Tom Perriello 
and Thomas Pravda who, as Hanrahan (2016b) points out, have connections to the 
US State Department and the British Foreign Office respectively. 
 
None of this might matter were it not for the strikingly similar line on Syria pushed by 
the White Helmets, the Syria Campaign and Avaaz: all call for a ‘no-fly zone’. Avaaz 
has repeatedly petitioned world leaders to enforce no-fly zones, first in Libya in 2011 
and then in Syria, maintaining that it is ‘the only decent thing to do’ and if ‘done well, 
might not cost a single life’.19 The website created for the White Helmets by the Syria 
Campaign invites visitors to sign up to a statement from the organisation’s leader 
calling on the UN to introduce a no-fly zone.20 The Syria Campaign has also argued 
that ‘We must push our leaders to be ready to use force’, suggesting that ‘European 
and US forces could strike the Syrian regime airbases and jets’ – modelling these 
‘punitive measures’ on what it sees as the successful strategy pursued by NATO in 
Bosnia in the 1990s.21 A no-fly zone sounds innocuous – about halting violence 
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rather than waging war. Yet the US general who oversaw the implementation of the 
Libya no-fly zone candidly describes it as ‘a violent combat action that results in lots 
of casualties’, while NATO’s former supreme allied commander says that ‘It is quite 
frankly an act of war...it’s basically to start a war with that country’ (quoted in 
Hanrahan 2016a). This is essentially the reasoning of critics who challenge the 
propaganda offensive centred on the White Helmets: that what is presented as a 
campaign for peace, humanitarianism and protection of civilians is actually part of a 





Perhaps critics who challenge the PR campaigns promoting military intervention as a 
way to protect civilians in Syria, and who question the regime-change policies of 
Western governments, are unhinged conspiracy theorists, Kremlin apologists or 
internet trolls. Perhaps funnelling millions of dollars into a war zone and 
strengthening armed extremists is a certain route to peace and stability. But recent 
experience, as well as reason, would suggest otherwise. A report by the UK 
parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee (2016: 39) said of the 2011 Libyan 
intervention: ‘The possibility that militant extremist groups would attempt to benefit 
from the rebellion should not have been the preserve of hindsight’. As the Committee 
also observed: 
 
By the summer of 2011, the limited intervention to protect civilians had drifted 
into an opportunist policy of regime change….The result was political and 
economic collapse, inter-militia and inter-tribal warfare, humanitarian and 
migrant crises, widespread human rights violations, the spread of…regime 
weapons across the region and the growth of ISIL in North Africa. 
(Foreign Affairs Committee 2016: 3) 
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